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I: Introduction 
In the second paragraph of"Domesticated and Then 
Some," Professor Duran characterizes her topic as "the 
question of the moral significance, from the standpoint 
of animal rights, of whether or not a species is 
domesticated." Her question, so stated, is crucially 
ambiguous. Is it 
Ql)	 What can be said about the moral 
significance of an individual animal in 
virtue of its being a member of a 
domesticated species or breed ralher than 
a wild species or subspecies?1 
Or is it 
02)	 What moral significance do domesticated 
species or breeds have in virtue of their 
being domesticated rather than wild? 
Duran's reference to "the standpoint of animal rights" 
in her topic sentence suggests that she is concerned with 
the former question, since, as she later admits, the 
animal rights literature is singularly individualistic.2 
On the other hand, Duran asserts that she and Tom 
Regan (the foremost animal rights theorist, and an 
adamantly individualistic one) 
...are not, presumably, addressing the same 
issue. I may wholeheartedly agree that the 
treatment of the Rhode Island Reds used for 
egg-laying and meat consumption purposes is 
inhwnane, and I may even become a vegetarian. 
But this is not the same thing as evincing a 
concern for the preservation of the Rhode 
Island Red as a breed, in comparison, say, to 
the Leghorn... 
This apparent attempt to distance herself from the 
individualistic stance of the animal rights movement 
suggests that she intends to address question Q2 rather 
thanQl' 
These two questions presumably are related, since 
showing that a wild species like the turkey vulture is 
more morally significant than a domesticated breed of 
turkey presumably would give us a reason to prefer 
killing an individual turkey in deference to a turkey 
vulture, if it came to that. However, the two questions 
are importantly distinct conceptually, and an argument 
which supports a certain answer to one may not simul­
taneously support an analogous answer to the other. 
Duran argues by comparing domesticated and wild 
animals in various ways and concludes that domesticated 
animals "compare favorably" with wild animals, 
meaning that, based on the comparisons she considers, 
domesticated animals are as or more morally significant 
than their wild cousins. In what follows, I consider 
each of her comparisons, clarifying the relevance of 
each comparison to questions Ql and Q2. The upshot 
of my discussion is that while Duran's comparisons 
support a certain answer to question Ql, they do not 
support an analogous answer to question Q2' 
Specifically, Duran's comparisons support answer A l 
to question Ql: 
AI)	 Individual animals have greater moral 
significance in virtue of their being 
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members of a domesticated species or 
breed rather than a wild species or 
subspecies, 
without at the same time supporting answer A2 to 
question Q2: 
Ai) Domesticated species or breeds have 
greater moral significance than wild 
species or subspecies. 
ll: Duran's Comparisons 
First comparison. Duran begins by observing that 
"many breeds [of domesticated animals] are ill­
equipped for survival without human help."3 This 
comparison would favor wild over domesticated 
individuals as well as wild over domesticated species 
(since, as Duran points out, some individual animals 
have been bred to have maladapted musculatures which 
endanger both the individJ4a1 and the breed, whereas 
others have become "shy breeders," which endangers the 
breed, but not necessarily the individual), but Duran later 
dismisses this comparison as morally irrelevant. She 
writes: 'The fact that a breed is ill-equipped for survival 
without human intervention...does not immediately 
seem to be a morally relevant difference". 
Second comparison. Duran then claims that "insofar 
as the characteristics having to do with putative moral 
significance are concerned, domesticated breeds are at 
least on a par with other animals." And she points out, 
in support of her claim, that "Domesticated creatures 
are, after all, sentient, just as the majority of non­
domesticated creatures [are]..... Later in the paper 
Duran considers a related comparison, namely that 
"Some breeds... seem simply to be more sensitive" than 
theirwild counterparts topain and/or emotional distress. 
Note, however, that since only individual animals are 
sentient, these comparisons suggest only that wild and 
domesticated individJ4als "compare favorably," not that 
domesticated breeds are on a par with wild species. 
Third comparison. Duran next observes that since 
"[domesticated animals'] reversion to type is only a 
speeded-up version of the general genetic change taking 
place in all living beings," insofar as Ibis is of any moral 
significance, it suggests that "domesticated animals 
[are] more or less on a par with non-domesticated 
animals." Since evolutionary changes do not occur 
within a single lifetime-since "reversion to type" 
cannot occur in a single generation-the reference of 
"they" in this comparison must be species and breeds 
rather than individuals. And so this comparison, if 
relevant, would suggest that domesticated breeds are 
on a par, morally, with wild species. 
Notice, however, that Duran never claims that a 
breed's or a species' being subject to genetic evolution 
is of any moral significance. And without an argument 
for that conclusion, it is difficult to see why it should 
be (especially if, like Duran, we have explicitly rejected 
as morally irrelevant the fact that domesticated breeds 
are ill-equipped for survival without human help).4 If 
the comparison is not ofany significance, however, then 
it provides no reason for thinking that domesticated 
breeds are on a par with wild species. So at this point 
in her paper, Duran has given us no reason for thinking 
that domesticated breeds are even on a par, morally, 
with wild species, and she has given us only one reason 
for thinking that domesticated individuals are more 
morally significant than wild individuals. 
Fourth comparison. After discussing the relevance 
of Rachels' moral individualism to our treatment of 
exceptional individuals, Duran introduces another 
comparison which, she believes, favors domesticated 
animals: she claims that many or most of them are 
"exceptional" or "gifted" members of their species. 
Here again, Duran does not explicitly claim that this 
comparison is morally relevant. She writes that 
"domesticated animals are not typical of their species, 
and if this.. .is relevant to their moral standing... [then] 
it probably speaks in their favor..... (emphasis altered). 
But let us grant that the comparison is significant. 
Clearly, the phrase "typical of their species" cannot be 
interpreted as referring to species, and the sense of the 
phrase is strained by interpreting it as referring to breeds. 
The sense pretty clearly is this: "the individual 
domesticated animals that make up a breed are not 
typical members of their species." Only individuals can 
be atypical representatives of their species. So even 
if we suppose that Duran has now given us a second 
reason for thinking that domesticated individuals are 
more morally significant than wild individuals, she still 
has not provided us with any reason for thinking that 
domesticated breeds are on a par with wild species. 
Fifth comparison. Duran next discusses the 
significance of the fact that domesticated breeds have 
acquired the special traits they have because human 
breeders valued those traits. At first glance this seems 
to be a comparison of domesticated and wild 
, individuals, since it is at the level of individuals that 
genetic "traits" are expressed. Earlier in the paper, 
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however, Duran alludes to the fact that "hwnan-created 
breeds... have contributed the most to the course of 
human history and culture." Since no Shire horse alive 
today has contributed to hwnan history, this seems pretty 
clearly to be a reference to domesticated breeds rather 
than individuals. So perhaps Duran's fIfth comparison 
is best construed as a comparison between domesticated 
individuals and/or breeds to wild individuals and/or 
species. As such, it represents the only reason Duran 
offers for thinking that domesticated breeds (as 
opposed to individuals) "compare favorably" with wild 
species (as opposed to individuals). 
But Duran is herself skeptical of the moral relevance 
of this comparison. She writes: "The fact that a 
breed... contributed greatly to the development of 
human culture, does not immediately seem to be a 
morally relevant difference," Moreover, it is unclear 
how much weight she would be willing to place on it 
even if it were admitted as relevant. She begins the 
paragraph in question by writing: 
One might be inclined to note that the traits
 
which these animals have are, ofcourse, traits
 
specifically desired by humans, but...one
 
could move with that assertion in either
 
direction.
 
Here Duran seems uncertain whether or not to be 
embarrassed by appearing to base concern for 
domesticated animals on anthropocentric reasoning, for 
the passage continues: 
Surely the fact that a German short-haired
 
pointer puppy may begin spontaneously to
 
point at an early age does not count against
 
the value of pointers as such, since pointing is
 
merely an exaggeration of traits which most
 
dogs possess.
 
This reference to "the value of pointers as such" 
suggests that Duran wants, if at all possible, to find 
inherent value in domesticated animals, rather than 
relying on their instrumental value to humans. The 
next sentence of the paragraph similarly suggests that 
she would be unwilling to place much weight on her 
fifth comparison even if it were admitted as morally 
relevant 
Sixth comparison. Here, Duran strikes off in an 
altogether different direction with a remark that 
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becomes her sixth comparison. She writes: "the 
counterargument that naturally occurring untouched 
species are members of the original primeval environ­
ment and hence deserve special consideration is strong" 
(emphasis added). Thus, she suggests that even if her 
fIfth comparison were admitted as morally relevant, this 
sixth comparison, which clearly favors wild species 
and/or individuals over domesticated breeds and/or 
individuals, would outweigh it. 
ill: Evaluating Duran's Conclusion 
Duran offers no other comparisons for consideration. 
In light of what I have said, then, what Duran has done 
in her paper comes to the following: 
Concerning question Ql> she has offered three 
reasons for thinking that individual domesticated 
animals are more morally significant than individual 
wild animals. Specifically, she has argued that 
A) they often are more acutely sensitive to pain 
and/or to emotional distress (comparison #2), 
B) they often are "exceptional" or "gifted" 
members of their species (comparison #4), and 
C) they often are valued by human beings for 
historical and cultural reasons (comparison #5). 
Although she appears to admit that (C), if morally 
relevant, is outweighed by the fact that individual 
members of wild species are "members of the original 
primeval environment," reasons (A) and (B) do, if 
accepted, support her contention that, on the whole, 
domesticated individuals are more morally significant 
than wild individuals. This is how Duran's argument 
supports answer Al to question QI. 
Concerning question Q2, Duran has offered only one 
comparison in support of answer A2, namely that 
domesticated breeds are more morally significant than 
wild species insofar as the former are of greater 
historical and cultural value than the latter. However, 
as I indicated earlier, Duran is herself skeptical of the 
relevance of this comparison, and she appears to think 
that it is outweighed by the fact that wild species are 
"members of the original primeval environment" So, 
rather than supporting answer A2 to question Q2, 
Duran's analysis actually supports answer A21: 
A21) Wild species or subspecies have greater 
moral significance than domesticated 
species or breeds. 
Duran's concluding paragraph is, therefore, 
misleadingly written. She writes: 
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In sum, I have argued that ifwe can accept
 
a view of animal rights for non-domesticated
 
species, there are probably no strong reasons
 
for denying the rights to domesticated species,
 
both when seen from the standpoint of the
 
individual creatures involved, and when seen
 
from the (more interesting. I believe) stand­

point of breeds vs. species.
 
Duran fails clearly to distinguish question QI from 
question Q2. and she therefore speaks as if. in arguing 
for a particular answer to the fIrSt question. she has 
simultaneously argued for an analogous answer to 
the second. 
Notes 
1 Hereafter I speak simply of wild "species" instead of 
"species or subspecies," and of domesticated "breeds" rather 
than "species or breeds." Also, in what follows I speak 
consistently of the relative "moral significance" of various 
entities. Duran speaks interchangeably of "moral 
significance" and "moral rights," but the two concepts are 
distinct from each other. and each is in tum distinct from the 
concept of bare moral considerability. On this point, .see 
Kenneth Goodpaster, "On Being Morally Considerable," 
JollT1llJ1oj"Philosophy75 (1978),pp. 311-12. To Goodpaster's 
analysis I would add only that, assuming that moral rights 
function to protect interests, having interests is a necessary 
condition for having rights, but not necessarily for being 
morally considerable. It may be that an object's being 
beautiful suffices to make it morally considerable. This, 
apparently, was G. E. Moore's view in Principia Ethica. For 
an application to endangered species (both wild and 
domesticated) see Lilly-Marlene Russow, "Why Do Species 
Matter?" Environmental Ethics3 (1981), pp. 101-12. Notice, 
however that Russow's argument does not show that 
endangered species and breeds themselves have aesthetic 
value, since, as she is careful to note, only the individual 
members ofan endangered breed or species instantiate beauty. 
2 Here "individualistic" means "attributing direct moral 
significance only to individual organisms." This is the usual 
sense of the terin in the literature of environmental ethics. 
Individualism in this sense is consistent with, but not 
equivalent to, the individualism which lames Rachels 
advocates, and which Duran explicitly discusses in her paper. 
3 Duran appears to think that this difference marks the 
core of the conceptual distinction between a domesticated 
breed and a wild subspecies. However, "domesticated" means 
,more than "no longer wild," and while the condition Duran 
Idtes probably is sufficient for saying that a species is no longer 
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wild, it is neither necessary nor sufficient for saying that it is 
domesticated. Probably the fact that a population would either 
perish or \Dldergo radical change if human interaction with it 
were withdrawn is sufficient for saying that it is no longer 
wild. A species like the California condor is no longer wild, 
precisely because this is true of it. However, the California 
condor is not therefore domesticated. So the fact that a 
population would either perish or undergo radical change if 
human interaction with it were withdrawn is not sufficient 
for saying that it is domesticated. Neither is it necessary, 
however. For surely there are or have been some domesticated 
breeds (e.g., prospectors' burros) which would neither perish 
nor change radically upon reverting to a feral condition. 
4 In my "Biological FWlctions and Biological Interests" 
(forthcoming) I argue that every individual organism has 
interests in the fulfillment of the biological functions of its 
various component organs and subsystems, where biological 
functions are dermed in terms of consequence selection of 
organs and subsystems in the individual's ancestors. My 
argument explains the relevance of an individual organism's 
being the product of evolution, without suggesting that 
evolving species have interests. The locus of what I call 
"biological interests" is the former, not the latter) 
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